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The aim of this paper is to analyze the foreign policy activism of a Republican 
congresswoman of Serbian descent Helen Delich Bentley during the war in Bos-
nia from 1992 to 1995. The paper will argue that Bentley was a congressional 
foreign policy entrepreneur utilizing nonlegislative avenues of foreign policy 
influence. Her policy aims from 1992 until the end of her term in Congress in 
1994 were to establish U.S. neutrality and nonintervention in Bosnia. Though 
unsuccessful on both fronts, Bentley’s foreign policy activism sheds light on the 
domestic policy debates over the formulation of U.S. policy towards Bosnia. 
The paper contributes to the literature on interventions in the Balkans and also 
to literature on congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship.
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Introduction
“Current Congressional sentiment is overwhelmingly anti-Serbian... It has reached 
a stage where it is becoming impossible for me to defend Serbia’s actions... Now, for 
the sake of the Serbian people, and of Yugoslavia, I am joining the chorus to request 
that you step down as President of the Republic of Serbia”, wrote congresswoman 
Helen Delich Bentley to Slobodan Milošević in September 1992.1 Thus ended an 
amiable working relationship that began three years earlier when Bentley attended 
the marking of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Though Bentley’s 
relationship with Milošević soured, she continued to consistently advocate for the 
Serbian cause within the halls of Capitol Hill until the end of her term in 1994. 
1 The author would like to thank the Langsdale Library, University of Baltimore, Maryland. 
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During the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995, the U.S. Congress challenged the 
George H.W. Bush Administration and later the Clinton Administration in seeking 
to formulate a more forceful U.S. policy in Bosnia. Richard Holbrooke, the chief 
architect of the Dayton Peace Accords, was to recall that congressional efforts on 
Bosnia led to “some of the most emotional and contentious struggles of the Clin-
ton Administration” (Holbrooke, 1998: 30-31). The congressional pressure was to 
culminate in the summer of 1995 with the passing of veto-proof legislation to uni-
laterally lift the UN-imposed arms embargo. Taking an active part in congressional 
deliberations from 1992 until 1994 was Helen Delich Bentley of Maryland’s 2nd 
Congressional District. The Republican congresswoman was the only member of 
the U.S. Congress of Serb descent with a close interest in the region at the time of 
the Bosnian war. 
The aim of this article is to analyze what policies the only Serbian-American 
member of Congress pursued during the Bosnian war. Analyzing the foreign policy 
activism of Bentley provides a clearer understanding of the internal U.S. debate on 
Bosnia, but also contributes to the existing literature on congressional foreign po-
licy entrepreneurs. Though very active at the time, her foreign policy activism has 
been understudied.2 This article, based primarily on Bentley’s newly accessible ar-
chives at the University of Baltimore, will seek to trace the activism and the foreign 
policy influence of this congresswoman. It will also shed light on the influence of 
ethnic politics in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
The article is theoretically grounded in the work of Ralph G. Carter and James 
M. Scott on congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs. These are “members of 
Congress who seek to initiate action on the foreign policy issues about which they 
care rather than await action from the administration” (Carter and Scott, 2009: 21-
22). Carter and Scott argued that analyzing the role of entrepreneurs through the 
study of formal legislation and roll-call votes accounts but for a part of policy ave-
nues. In addition to studying direct legislative avenues such as formal legislation, 
Carter and Scott argued for the analysis of nonlegislative avenues of influence such 
as framing the issue, shaping the agenda, cultivating foreign contacts, and partici-
pating at hearings. It is by considering the diverse avenues of influence that a con-
gressional entrepreneur’s role in foreign policy can be assessed. Entrepreneurs act 
in a condition of policy vacuum or with a view to correcting an existing policy. Ac-
cording to Scott, there are four avenues of congressional foreign policy influence 
(Scott, 1997):
2 Exceptions are Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars, 
Cornell University Press, 2003; Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic, This Time We Knew: 
Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, NYU Press, 1996. 

















This article will argue that Representative Helen Delich Bentley was a congres-
sional foreign policy entrepreneur utilizing direct nonlegislative and indirect non-
legislative avenues of influence. In fact, during the 102nd Congress (1991-1992) 
and 103rd Congress (1993-1994), Bentley did not introduce any resolutions or bills 
regarding the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. She co-sponsored three bills regard-
ing Yugoslavia during the 102nd Congress and was a co-sponsor of one bill on Yu-
goslavia during the 103rd Congress. This lends support to the thesis that Bentley’s 
activism was focused on the nonlegislative avenues of foreign policy influence.
It will be argued that most of Bentley’s efforts were directed at framing the 
debate on the Bosnian war and setting the agenda. The utilization of direct nonle-
gislative avenues such as direct correspondence and participation at hearings were 
geared towards framing. Her overarching aim was to secure U.S. neutrality towards 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Prior to the declaration of Bosnian independ-
ence and prior to its recognition by the U.S., Bentley made the case against recogni-
tion of independence. Subsequently, she was a fierce critic of recognition of Yugo-
slav break-away states. After the beginning of the war in Bosnia in April 1992 and 
the increasingly pro-Bosnian sentiment in the U.S. Congress, Bentley sought to pro-
vide the “other side” of the story. To this end, she took part in hearings, wrote letters 
to editors, sought to marshall Serbian-American community resources, and tried to 
influence Milošević to shed his communist and aggressor image. Furthermore, an 
umbrella organization SerbNet was founded of which Bentley became an honorary 
president. Though these were extra-congressional efforts, Bentley conducted them 
while serving in Congress.
The Bosnian War
The beginning of the end of Yugoslavia can be traced to Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević’s efforts from mid-1989 to strengthen the dominance of Serbia within the 
Yugoslav Federation. In 1991, Yugoslav republics Slovenia and Croatia declared 
their independence. The Yugoslav federal army failed to suppress Slovenian inde-
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pendence following which Milošević and the army turned on Croatia. In Bosnia, 
the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) of Radovan Karadžić declared areas of Bosnia 
with a Serb majority as “Serb Autonomous Regions” and openly called for seces-
sion (Malcolm, 1996: 213-225). The political leadership of Bosnia was rightly con-
cerned about the spill-over into Bosnia and the repetition of the Yugoslav army’s 
and paramilitaries’ rampage in Croatia.
With Slovenian and Croatian independence recognized by the European Eco-
nomic Community in December 1991, Bosnia faced two options: to remain part of a 
smaller Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia or to opt for independence. The decision was 
to hold the referendum on February 29, and March 1, 1992. The turnout was ap-
proximately 64%, with overwhelming support in favor of independence (Malcolm, 
1996: 230-231). The recognition of Bosnia by the European Economic Community 
followed on April 6 and by the U.S. the next day. The Yugoslav National Army and 
Serb paramilitaries in Bosnia embarked on their rampage. The UN arms embargo 
imposed on Yugoslavia in September 1991 remained in place, in effect curtailing 
Bosnia’s ability to defend itself while freezing the military superiority in favor of the 
Yugoslav army and the paramilitaries. Efforts to lift the UN arms embargo became a 
key foreign-policy priority of Bosnia. In the U.S., congressional activism in formu-
lating U.S. policy towards Bosnia centered on lifting the embargo on Bosnia. 
Britain and France, with their troops on the ground in Bosnia as part of the UN 
force, feared that lifting of the embargo would escalate the violence and endanger 
their troops. The presence of UN troops with a weak and ill-defined mandate be-
came a major stumbling block in efforts to achieve peace in Bosnia. The three-and-
a-half year war in Bosnia ended with the Dayton Peace Accords reached in Novem-
ber and formally signed in December 1995. This followed shuttle diplomacy and 
marathon meetings spearheaded by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke 
(Holbrooke, 1998; Power, 2002).
It was during the Bosnian war that NATO became involved in the conflict. Be-
ginning in 1993, NATO was enforcing the UN-imposed no-fly-zone over Bosnia. 
In early 1994, the alliance had its first-ever military engagement when it shot down 
Bosnian Serb aircraft violating the no-fly-zone. In August and September 1995, 
NATO conducted an extended air campaign against Bosnian Serb targets that paved 
the way to Dayton peace talks. The alliance was to play a key role in implementing 
the Dayton Peace Accords.
U.S. Congress and the War in Bosnia
As Yugoslavia’s process of dissolution proceeded, congressional foreign policy en-
trepreneurs increasingly voiced their support of the right of Yugoslav republics to 
seek independence. Foremost among the activists was Republican senator Bob Dole 
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who had been drawing attention to the repression of Kosovar Albanians. Follow-
ing the beginning of the war in Bosnia, Congress passed legislation in 1992 to deny 
Serbia and Montenegro Most Favored Nation status. This was directly linked to 
Serbia and Montenegro’s support for the Bosnian Serbs in the war.3 However, the 
major bone of contention between the Clinton Administration and congressional 
entrepreneurs was over whether and how to end the U.S. participation in a UN-im-
posed arms embargo. The embargo, originally introduced in 1991 on the whole of 
Yugoslavia, applied to Bosnia and thereby cemented the military superiority of the 
Bosnian Serb side. Congressional efforts throughout the 1992-1995 period were to 
be directed at lifting the embargo. In 1994, Nunn-Mitchell Amendment was passed 
which ended the financing of the U.S. enforcement of the arms embargo in the 
Adriatic Sea. This decision led to contention within the NATO alliance as the Brit-
ish and French governments considered any effort at easing the embargo as a factor 
that would lead to more violence. The Administration heeded to the allies’ concerns 
leading to friction between the executive and legislative branches on this issue. 
During 1994, the Congress itself was torn apart between advocates of multilateral 
lifting of the embargo such as Democratic majority leader George Mitchell and 
advocates of unilateral U.S. lifting of the embargo which included Senators Dole 
and Joseph Lieberman and Representative Frank McCloskey. With the Republican 
victory in November elections of 1994, one of the key Bosnia activists Bob Dole 
became majority leader. In January 1995, Dole introduced legislation to lift the em-
bargo4 and his legislation, with minor changes, was overwhelmingly supported in 
both houses of Congress in the summer of 1995 (Sciolino, 1995). In early August 
1995, President Clinton vetoed the legislation and the Administration commenced 
its most serious effort at finding a peaceful solution for Bosnia. This effort was to 
culminate in the Dayton Peace Accords.
While the sentiment of most congressional entrepreneurs was in favor of lift-
ing the embargo and conducting air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets, at the other side 
of the debate on the U.S. policy towards Bosnia was the frequently lonely voice of 
Maryland’s Representative Helen Delich Bentley. The Republican congresswoman 
was to spend much of the 1992-1994 period providing the Serb version of events 
in Bosnia. Her overall aim was to achieve U.S. neutrality and nonintervention in 
Bosnia. 
3 H.R.5258 – To provide for the withdrawal of most favored nation status from the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia and to provide for the restoration of such status if certain conditions are 
fulfilled, May 21, 1992, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session.
4 S.21 – Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995, January 4, 1995, 104th Congress, 
1st Session.
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From Maryland to the Balkans
Helen Delich Bentley, first elected to Congress in the 1984 elections, had been ac-
tive in the Serbian-American community before the Yugoslav crisis. Bentley’s ac-
tivism on Yugoslavia can be traced to her visit on the occasion of the 600th anni-
versary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989. Bentley’s office issued a press statement 
in June 1989 announcing that she accepted His Holiness Patriarch German’s – the 
Prelate of the Serbian Orthodox Church – invitation to be his special guest for the 
600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle. Her press release stated that she would be 
joined on this trip by her husband and that this is their personal trip to Yugoslavia.5 
Bentley met Milošević and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, as well as members 
of the opposition in Serbia.6 Following her trip, Bentley sent a letter to Milošević 
thanking him for his hospitality while she was in Serbia. “I can think of no more 
thrilling site than seeing the multitude of people gathered at Gazimestan on Vi-
dovdan from your helicopter as we left for Belgrade. I left your country convinced 
that many good things will come of your presidency...”, wrote Bentley following 
her trip to Serbia.7 The following year, in July 1990, she was a key participant in the 
Serbian American Days in Washington further cementing her role as the Serbian-
American voice in the capital.8 
Amid Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Bentley became more vocal in calling for U.S. 
neutrality. In February 1991, the Subcommittee on Europe of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee held a hearing on Yugoslavia. Bentley asserted that the best 
policy was to preserve Yugoslavia. Pointing to history, Bentley reminded that Serbs 
were the only allies of the U.S. during previous conflicts. She also noted the impor-
tance of the battle of Kosovo in 1389 which stopped the advance of the Ottomans 
and provided for the prospering of Christianity in Europe.9
5 Congresswoman Bentley to be Guest of Serbian Patriarch German for the 600th Anniversary 
of the Battle of Kosovo, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 23, Press 
Release, b-4-23, 1; University of Baltimore Archives (Henceforth, UBA).
6 Congresswoman Bentley to be Guest of Serbian Patriarch German for the 600th Anniversary 
of the Battle of Kosovo, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 23, Press 
Release, b-4-23, 1; UBA; Schemo, 1991.
7 Kosovo Trip of HDB for 600th Anniversary of Battle of Kosovo, Helen Delich Bentley Col-
lection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 23, b-5-23; UBA.
8 Serbian American Days in Washington – July 22-24 ’90, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Se-
ries VII. Balkans, Box 22, Report Resolution, b-88-22; UBA.
9 Civil war in Yugoslavia: The U.S. Response – Statement by Congresswoman Helen Delich 
Bentley before the European Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Febru-
ary 21, 1991; Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 22, Remarks, b-60-22, 
1; UBA.
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The Baltimore Sun reported in April 1991 on another visit by Bentley to Yugo-
slavia during which she conceded that Milošević had become “a little too authori-
tarian”. According to the article, Bentley was walking a fine line between maintain-
ing her contact with Milošević but also trying to induce change in Serbia (Schemo, 
1991). Following her trip, Bentley co-signed a letter to her congressional colleagues 
in July 1991 calling for the U.S. to stay neutral with respect to Yugoslavia until the 
situation was resolved.10
With Slovenian and Croatian independence increasingly internationally recog-
nized, Bentley became a strong critic of recognition. In early April 1992, Bentley 
attended an event with the Serbian-American community in Milwaukee and opined 
that the U.S. would not recognize Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia or Macedonia until 
they were internationally recognized as independent republics (Cuprisin, 1992). At 
the end of April 1992, she sent a letter to Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Ea-
gleburger calling for the U.S. to be a neutral arbiter and not to favor any side in the 
Yugoslav disputes.11 Following the U.S. recognition of Yugoslav republics, Bentley 
sent a letter to President George H.W. Bush in April 1992 stating her “shock and 
dismay” that the U.S. recognized the former Yugoslav republics. She claimed that 
the recognition resulted in more violence and had the potential to cause a “civil 
war” in the Balkans.12 During a visit to Serbia the following month, Bentley reas-
serted that recognition of Bosnia was premature (Bowman, 1992a).
As the war in Bosnia escalated, Bentley’s focus shifted from criticizing the 
Administration’s recognition of breakaway republics to seeking U.S. neutrality. By 
July 1992, Bentley was claiming that all sides in the Bosnian conflict were to blame. 
In her view, an intervention in Yugoslavia would lead to a new Vietnam. She em-
phasized that she was working to defend the Serbian people, and not the regime in 
Serbia (Bowman, 1992b). As part of her nonlegislative activism, Bentley worked on 
defending Serbia’s interests. On April 28, 1992, Bentley wrote a letter to a producer 
at CNN Roger Bahre. She contacted him regarding an inaccurate map shown on 
CNN the previous day which did not show the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina 
as parts of Serbia. She asked the producer to make the necessary correction and of-
fered to have him contact persons who were recently in Yugoslavia and who could 
talk about the issue.13
10 Dear Colleague Letter re: Republican Study Committee Promotion of Lantos Resolution, He-
len Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 29, Letter, b-55-29; UBA.
11 “HDB Correspondence to Eagleburger”, HDB; Series VII. Balkans, Box 5, Yugoslavia, Ca-
talog no. 4157-1.
12 Letter Sent to Pres. Bush from Mrs. Bentley re: U.S. recognition of Croatia, Helen Delich 
Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 30, Letter, b-16-30; UBA.
13 HDB, Box 26, Correspondence: HDB to CNN re: Maps on their Newscasts, Letter, b-110-26.
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2013, pp. 99-113
106
That Bentley was the voice of the Serbian-American community in the capital 
is seen from the following letter. On May 21, 1992, Information Secretary of the 
Chicago committee of Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party) 
sent a letter to Bentley with an attachment of a report by a Northeastern Illinois 
University professor’s trip to Dubrovnik in Croatia. The trip, according to the letter, 
was sponsored by Serbian Democratic Party of Chicago. At the end of the letter, the 
Information Secretary writes: “Please keep in mind that Professor .... is extremely 
familiar with the Serbian problems in Yugoslavia. He is an excellent candidate for 
testifying at the hearings in Congress for the Serbian Cause.”14
When news of the Serb-run notorious camps for Bosnian Muslims and Croats 
were confirmed in summer of 1992, Bentley sent a letter to Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadžić informing him of reports of Serb-run “concentration camps” for 
Muslims. She said she hoped it was not true and asked that he allow neutral observ-
ers access to the locations to show it is not true. She wrote that the sooner this was 
accomplished, the better it would be for the Serbian people. She also stated that with 
so much disinformation tarnishing the Serbian image, this incident would be “abso-
lutely devastating”.15 A few days later, Bentley again sent a letter to Karadžić ask-
ing him to inform her of what is going on at the Omarska detention camp in Bosnia 
and who the detainees were. She expected him to fulfill his offer that the Red Cross 
take charge of the camps. “This is of key importance if the Serbian name is ever 
to be cleared in the Western press”, wrote Bentley.16 In November 1992 she sent a 
letter to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stating that “it is imperative 
that the opening up and inspection of ALL detention camps on ALL territories of 
the former Yugoslavia begin immediately”, and emphasized the need for “all three 
sides” to open up their camps.17
In September 1992, Bentley organized a hearing in Congress for the Bishop 
of Herzegovina Atanasije Jevtić. In a Dear Colleague letter, Bentley presented the 
Bishop as a “fierce opponent of Communism and the Milošević regime” who would 
provide a “first-hand account of events in Herzegovina”. In Bentley’s press release 
following the hearing, she stated that Jevtić shared his view on the Croat occupation 
of Herzegovina and the atrocities committed by all three sides as well as Croatian 
14 Correspondence to HDB re: Yugoslavia: Part 1, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. 
Balkans, Box 5, Letters, Memos, Faxes, 4115-1; UBA.
15 Milosevic Folder, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 7, Letters, 
4173-1; UBA.
16 Milosevic Folder, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 7, Letters, 
4173-1; UBA.
17 Cong Bentley, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 5, Letters, State-
ment, Report, Congressional Record, 4145-1; UBA.
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and Muslim destruction of Orthodox churches. The press release stated that Jevtić 
and Bentley agreed that the three leaders – Slobodan Milošević, Franjo Tuđman and 
Alija Izetbegović – were to blame for the situation in Yugoslavia.18
Outside the Congress, Bentley kept in frequent touch in 1992 with John 
Kennedy of John Kennedy Associates, a public relations outfit in London working 
for the Serbian cause.19 Her correspondence papers also suggest close contacts with 
the Crown Prince Alexander of the Karadjordjevic dynasty. Correspondence with 
both was mainly focused on trying to tone down U.S. and western Europe media 
coverage highly critical of Serbia.
Amid increasing coverage of Bosnian Serb brutality and increasingly critical 
media coverage, the Serbian-American activists under the umbrella organization 
SerbNet struck back. In early August 1992, The New York Times ran an ad paid 
for by SerbNet Inc. entitled “President Bush, Governor Clinton: Why Take Sides 
in A Civil War? Instead, Be the Peacemaker in Bosnia”. The ad stated that all sides 
were to blame for the conflict, accused Bosnian Muslims of refusing to negotiate 
and asked why there were no sanctions against Croatia when Croatian troops were 
in Bosnia.20
Bentley’s activism on behalf of Serbia led to resentment in her congressional 
constituency. Bentley’s reelection rival in 1992 Michael C. Hickey Jr. criticized her 
for devoting more time to Serbia than to her constituency. He called on her to resign 
as president of a Serbian-American advocacy group SerbNet Inc., a post that Bent-
ley said was honorary. According to The Sun, Hickey’s criticism was based on an 
article in a Serbian-American newspaper supportive of Bentley which said: “Serbs 
have only one voice in Congress – Helen Delich Bentley. She has sacrificed her ca-
reer to promote and fight for Serbia and Serbs... Mrs. Bentley has only two Serbs 
in her congressional district, yet she spends a majority of her time helping Serbs.” 
Bentley said that the article omitted a key phrase – that of the time she spent on fo-
reign policy issues, most was devoted to Serbia. The article also mentioned that her 
reelection campaign in 1992 received around $80,000 from the Serbian-Americans 
(Carson, 1992).
Criticism of her activism extended to constituents. A Maryland constituent 
wrote her in June 1992 criticizing her “misguided support of the Communist Serb-
18 Hearing of Bishop Jevtic, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 27, 
News Articles, Press Release, Testimony, Remarks, b-129-27; UBA.
19 Correspondence to HDB re: Yugoslavia: Part 1, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. 
Balkans, Box 5, Letters, Memos, Faxes, 4115-1; UBA.
20 SerbNet Ad: President Bush, Governor Clinton: Why Take Sides in A Civil War? Instead, Be 
the Peacemaker in Bosnia, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 27, News 
Ad, b-94-27; UBA.
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led Yugoslavian army through your Serb-Net Inc.”. The same constituent wrote her 
again in early August 1992 writing that it was incomprehensible how she or anyone 
could support “Serbian Nationalists” amid worldwide condemnation of their ac-
tions in Bosnia. The constituent asked her to condemn the atrocities in Bosnia and 
distance herself from Serbian nationalists.21 
The congressional elections in 1992 echoed the conflict in the Balkans. In 
October 1992, The Sun ran a story of how Bentley’s reelection effort pitted Serb 
and Croat supporters and that the reelection campaign in 2nd Congressional Dis-
trict of Maryland was, in a way, an extension of the Yugoslav conflict. Her rival 
Hickey focused his criticism of her work for the Serbian advocacy group SerbNet, 
Inc. He charged that Bentley was using her office to promote support for SerbNet, 
Inc. Hickey meanwhile had picked up support for the most part from Americans of 
Croatian descent (Bowman, 1992).
In October 1992, The Baltimore Sun ran advertisements paid for by the Mary-
land Coalition to Stop Ethnic Cleansing sharply critical of Bentley. The ads stated: 
“Helen Delich Bentley ostensibly was elected to the US House of Representatives to 
represent the 2nd Congressional District here in Maryland. But careful examination 
of her Congressional work record... [shows] her primary efforts are focused less on 
her Maryland constituency than on her role as a mouthpiece for Serbia... She used 
her influence in Congress to help Serbia’s criminal government to avoid diplomatic 
and military consequences for their military aggression, violation of human rights, 
and ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina... she was one of two mem-
bers of Congress who spoke against a Congressional resolution condemning the 
Serbs for these camps.” The ad notes that she was the president of SerbNet and 
called on voters in the 2nd Congressional District to “put your ‘X’ or pull the lever 
to end the career of Helen Delich Bentley. The outgunned victims of Sarajevo... will 
appreciate your action on behalf of universal human rights that we take for granted 
here in Maryland.” This ad ran on October 11, 1992. Another ad critical of Bentley 
that ran in The Baltimore Sun quotes her along with the picture of Bosnian Muslims 
detained at a notorious camp. The ad asks: “Does Helen Delich Bentley represent 
Maryland or Serbia?... On November 3rd, vote against Helen Delich Bentley”.22 
In November 1992, The Baltimore Sun ran a story how Bentley’s rival in the 
elections was increasingly using her advocacy for Serbia as a focus of criticism. Ac-
cording to this story, Bentley’s press spokesperson Blaine Taylor resigned and called 
for the congresswoman to change her policy towards Serbia. The article quoted Dr. 
21 Loose papers Part 3, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 4, News Ar-
ticles, Letters, Reports, 4088-1; UBA.
22 Correspondence to HDB from Milan Panic, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Bal-
kans, Box 5, Yugoslavia, Letters, Faxes, Memos – Part 2, 4176-1; UBA.
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Philip Cohen who was active in the Maryland Coalition to Stop Ethnic Cleansing, 
an advocacy group which sponsored ads critical of Bentley. The congresswoman 
defended her position claiming that only part of the story in Yugoslavia was heard 
and that here efforts were aimed towards balancing and providing Serbs’ view of the 
conflict. Her opponent Hickey criticized Bentley for having two staffers in her of-
fice work on Serbian issues. She conceded as a mistake that official stationary was 
used but denied that staff were assigned to work on Serbian issues. According to the 
article, Bentley also received a $1000 campaign contribution from Milan Panić, a 
Serbian-American and the prime minister of Yugoslavia. The article said that of the 
$842 000 in campaign contribution, Bentley received approximately $100 000 from 
Serbian-Americans (Hill, 1992).
The sharp tone of the congressional elections in 1992 notwithstanding, Bentley 
secured another term in the House of Representatives. That year she had also been 
closely following elections in Serbia where her fellow Serbian-American Milan 
Panić challenged Slobodan Milošević. Bentley’s archives indicate frequent contacts 
with Panić since his name first came up for consideration for the position of Yugo-
slav prime minister in 1992. However, Milošević outwitted the newcomer to Ser-
bian domestic politics and Bentley in effect lost a crucial political ally in Serbia.
Following her own congressional reelection, Bentley remained closely in-
volved with the Balkans. In January 1993, she advised Bosnian Serb leader Ra-
dovan Karadžić to accept the Vance-Owen peace proposal which would have recog-
nized most of the Bosnian Serb military conquests. Bentley wrote to urge Bosnian 
Serb Republic Parliament “to vote in favor of the Peace Plan which, I understand, 
could lead to a final settlement as well as be conducive to stabilizing the region”.23
Within the Congress, Bentley sought to provide the Serbian version of events 
in what she deemed to be heavily anti-Serbian media coverage. Writing to her con-
gressional colleague Representative Bill Paxton in March 1993, Bentley voiced her 
concern about “... the western media’s one-sided portrayal of Yugoslavia’s civil war 
as a case of Serbian aggression against Muslim neighbors... To ignore the Serbian 
side betrays a people who have been America’s most loyal allies in the Balkans 
throughout this century.” She also attached documents for Paxton providing the 
view from the Serbian side. She dismissed the notion of an aggression stating that 
Bosnian Serbs lived in Bosnia for ages. Furthermore, she wrote that “Bosnia as a 
political entity dates only to post 1945, when communist dictator Tito arbitrarily 
created it as an internal administrative border within Yugoslavia”.24 A few months 
23 Dr. Radovan Karadzic. Pres. of Serbs in Bosnia, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. 
Balkans, Box 35, Letter, b-70-35; UBA.
24 Dr. Radovan Karadzic. Pres. of Serbs in Bosnia, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. 
Balkans, Box 35, Letter, b-70-35; UBA.
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later, Bentley took part in the U.S. Helsinki Commission hearings on Bosnia held 
on October 21, 1993, in which she asserted that the sanctions against Serbia were 
hurting the poor people the most.25 
Outside of Congress, Bentley reached out to editors. She addressed a letter in 
April 1993 to Steve Weisman of The New York Times and attached documents with 
the Serbian side of the conflict. She made the point that Serbs had been America’s 
“most loyal allies” in the 20th century. Bentley wrote of “Yugoslavia’s civil war” 
and asked Weisman to consider that Bosnian Serbs are “not grabbing Muslim lands, 
but rather defending their own homes”. She further claimed that many of the atroci-
ties attributed to Serbs “were perpetrated by Muslims against their own people to 
gain western sympathy”.26
Correspondence with Milošević
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the Bentley congressional papers is 
her intensive correspondence with Slobodan Milošević in 1991 and 1992. These 
will be quoted at length for they represent as yet unpublished correspondence. To 
get a sense of how their relationship evolved, it is useful to provide an overview of 
their correspondence throughout the period. 
In January 1991, Bentley urged Milošević “to remove all red star insignia in 
use by the military and the Republic of Serbia, not just by statute, but also physi-
cally. The continual appearance of the red star... has also been seized on by the inter-
national media, who use it to justify their claims of communist Serbian leadership.” 
In a late July 1991 letter, Bentley lamented the growing anti-Serbian public opinion 
in the U.S. She informed Milošević of Representative Tom Lantos’ recently-intro-
duced resolution calling for direct aid to Yugoslav separatist republics. She further 
wrote that the Serbian image in the U.S. would be bolstered if progressive reforms 
were undertaken in Serbia and that this could be facilitated by bringing into the go-
vernment prominent public figures. In December 1991, Bentley urged Milošević 
that Serbia continue taking part in the Hague conference so as not to isolate itself. 
She also urged caution “in any official recognition of either Serbs in Croatia or 
Bosnia. This is a two-edged sword, and would force international recognition of the 
province of Kosovo as an independent republic.” 
In late February 1992, Bentley wrote that after consultations with “Washing-
ton power circles”, she came to the conclusion that Milošević’s visit would not be 
25 Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “The Fate of the Peo-
ple of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, October 21, 1993, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, 38.
26 Correspondence from HDB to Steve Weisman of The New York Times re: Fair Representation 
in Press, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 30, Letter, b-110-30; UBA.
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welcomed. “... Serbia is unfortunately still perceived in the west as a ‘Bolshevik’ or 
‘Communist’ state.” To improve Serbia’s image, she urged that Milošević publicly 
renounce communism, remove the red star from official insignia and lift restrictions 
on the press. She also conceded that she was “coming under increasing fire from 
Congress and from the American public, as are some of my other colleagues, for 
supporting a country that is considered the last bastion of communism in Europe”. 
In late April 1992, the congresswoman wrote in a sharper tone that Milošević 
“must” undertake efforts to “salvage Serbia’s reputation”. She urged him to pub-
licly call for an end to violence, call on the U.S., the UN, and the EC to take part 
in negotiations, support Bosnia’s international borders, and declare that the new 
Yugoslav army exists only within the new federal state and renounce those units 
that remained in Bosnia, and declare that Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia have a right 
to self-determination. She urged that these measures be undertaken.27 On April 7, 
1992, Bentley wrote to Milošević urging him to lift economic sanctions that Ser-
bia imposed on Bosnia and Macedonia. She drew his attention to President Bush’s 
statement that the U.S. would drop its economic sanctions on Serbia once Serbia 
lifted its sanctions on Bosnia and Macedonia. “... It will be impossible to block the 
passage of any anti-Serbian legislation in Congress without such an action on your 
part”, she wrote. On April 30, 1992, she wrote that Serbia was perceived as the 
“guilty” side in the violence and stated that the priority of leadership of the new Yu-
goslavia should be to establish peace in Bosnia. She warned that failure of the peace 
process would result in greater isolation of Yugoslavia. 
In June 1992, Bentley wrote Milošević urging him that the Sarajevo airport be 
open so that relief supplies can be delivered to the city. “I would impress upon you 
to use your influence with Mr. Karadžić and other Serbian leaders in Bosnia-Herze-
govina not to hinder any of these future convoys... The feeling of ill will towards 
Serbia due to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina... continues to grow... It is vital 
that the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo improve. This rests on your shoulders 
alone.”28 
On September 22, 1992, Bentley informed Milošević that the House of Repre-
sentatives passed legislation withdrawing Most Favored Nation status from Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. “... Current Congressional sentiment is overwhelmingly 
anti-Serbian, and there was no real chance of defeating this bill... It has reached a 
stage where it is becoming impossible for me to defend Serbia’s actions... Now, for 
27 Correspondences from Helen Bentley to Slobodan Milosevic, Helen Delich Bentley Collecti-
on; Series VII. Balkans, Box 26, b-107-26; UBA.
28 HDB Letters to Milosevic, Helen Delich Bentley Collection; Series VII. Balkans, Box 11, 
4256-1; UBA.
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the sake of the Serbian people, and of Yugoslavia, I am joining the chorus to request 
that you step down as President of the Republic of Serbia. The destruction of Serbia 
must stop, and this is the only way that is acceptable to the international commu-
nity”, wrote congresswoman Bentley.29
Her relationship with Milošević damaged, Bentley continued to closely follow 
the events in the Balkans throughout the remainder of her term. The end of her con-
gressional career came as a result of her decision to run for governor of Maryland. 
In November 1993, Bentley began her gubernatorial campaign. The Baltimore Sun 
noted that she was “the lone congressional voice supporting Serbia as Yugoslavia 
fell apart and the world learned of Serbian atrocities”.30 Bentley was defeated in her 
run for governor and thus ended the congressional career of the five-term repre-
sentative from Maryland. 
Conclusion
Bentley’s legacy in foreign policy includes efforts to preserve Yugoslavia in 1991 
and to advise the Bush Administration not to recognize the breakaway republics of 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia in 1992. As the war in Bosnia escalated and, amid in-
creasingly negative media coverage of Serbia and Serb actions in Bosnia, Bentley 
sought to present the Serbian version of events. To this end, Bentley utilized both 
the direct nonlegislative and the indirect nonlegislative avenues of influence. She 
participated in hearings, wrote to editors, and sought to marshall the resources of 
the Serbian-American community towards a common aim – presenting the Serbian 
side of the story. Her policy aim was to neutralize the increasingly pro-Bosnian 
congressional sentiment and to maintain U.S. nonintervention. Her lack of success 
on both fronts notwithstanding, Bentley’s activism is a prime example of congres-
sional foreign policy entrepreneurship. An analysis of Bentley’s activism in the U.S. 
domestic debate on the policy towards Bosnia contributes both to the literature on 
intervention in the Balkans and to literature on congressional foreign policy entre-
preneurs.
29 Correspondences from Helen Bentley to Slobodan Milosevic, Helen Delich Bentley Collecti-
on; Series VII. Balkans, Box 26, b-107-26; UBA.
30 John B. O’Donnell, “Bentley kickoff is uncharacteristically nervous”, The Baltimore Sun, 
November 11, 1993.
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